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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Eminent Domain-Compensation for Removal Costs
The United States Government, under the authority of the Second
War Powers Act,'* condemned part of a warehouse leased by the defendant, General Motors Corporations. The defendant used this warehouse as the master warehouse for the storage and distribution of
automobile parts and had installed equipment costing approximately
$101,000. At the time of taking there was located about $250,000
worth of parts and machinery in the space confiscated by the Government. Five weeks were spent in removing the property and clearing
the space, and much of the property which could not be moved had to
be demolished. The defendant contended that the cost of removal
Title II of the Second War Powers Act, 56 STAT. 177, 50 U. S. C. A.
§632 (1942). "The Secretary of War . . . may cause proceedings to
be instituted . . . to acquire by condemnation, any real property, temporary use
thereof, or other interest therein . .. that shall be deemed necessary, for military . . . or other war purposes..
APPENDIX
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should be an element in determining fair compensation for the condemnation. The trial court refused to allow this, and submitted to the
jury the test that fair value was to be measured by only the fair market
rental value of the space condemned. However, the Circuit Court of
Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed the trial court and allowed the
elements of expense of moving and damage to the equipment to be
considered by the jury in determining the fair compensation due the
defendant.2
The general rule for computing compensation is the fair market
value of the property confiscated, 3 although what constitutes "just compensation" in condemnation proceedings has given rise to broad statements which would apparently cover every element of damages. The
Supreme Court recognizing a broad view has said: "Such compensation
means the full and equivalent in money of the property taken. The
owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken." 4 At the same time the
Supreme Court has pointed out that so many and varied are the circumstances which are to be taken into account in determining the value of the

property condemned that it is almost impossible to formulate a rule governing the applicability in every case because exceptional circumstances
would necessitate modifying the most well-guarded rule.5 "It is a wellsettled rule that while it is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which
is the measure of compensation for the property taken ... not all losses
suffered by the owner are compensible under the Fifth Amendment."
2General Motors Corp. v. United States, 140 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).

'Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 54 Sup. Ct. 704, 78 L. ed. 1236 (1934) ;
United States v. Meyer, 113 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); United States
ex rel T. V. A. v. Phillips, 50 Fed. Supp. 454 (Dist. D. Ga. 1913) ; City & County
of Denver v. Minshall, 109 Colo. 31, 121 P. (2d) 667 (1942); In re PlymouthBeacon Meadow-Otselic Center County Road, 145 Misc. 353, 261 N. Y. Supp. 76
(1932); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N. C. 200, 17 S. E. (2d) 10
(1941); Carolina-Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiwassee River Power Co., 186 N. C.
179, 119 S. E. 213 (1923).
'United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 373, 63 Sup. Ct. 276, 279, 87 L. ed.
336, 342 (1943), rehearing denied, 318 U. S. 798, 63 Sup. Ct. 557, 87 L. ed. 1162
(1943); accord, Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 52 F. (2d)
372 (C. C. A. 8th 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. 5.676, 52 Sup. Ct. 131, 76 L. ed.
572 (1931); United States v. Rayno, 136 F. (2d) 376 (C. C. A. 1st 1943);
Fitzsimmons & Galvin v. Rodgers, 243 Mich. 649, 220 N. W. 881 (1928).
'United States v. Chandler-Dun bar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 51, 77, 33
Sup. Ct. 667, 677, 57 L. ed. 1063. 1081 (1913); accord, United States v. Miller,
317 U. 5. 369, 63 Sup. Ct. 276, 87 L. ed. 336 (1943), rehearing denied, 318 U. S.

798, 63 Sup. Ct. 557, 87 L. ed. 1162 (1943).

'United States ex rel T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 281, 63 Sup. Ct.
1047, 1056, 87 L. ed. 1390, 1401; accord, United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369,
63 Sup. Ct. 276, 87 L. ed. 336 (1943), rehearing denied, 318 U. S. 798, 63 Sup. Ct.
557, 87 L. ed. 1162 (1943) ; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,
229 U. S. 51, 53 Sup. Ct. 667, 57 L. ed. 1063 (1913) ; Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 30 Sup. Ct. 459, 54 L. ed. 725 (1910); United
States ex rel T. V. A. v. Phillips, 50 Fed. Supp. 454 (Dist. D. Ga. 1943) ; City
of Los Angeles v. Harper, 139 Cal. App. 331, 33 P. (2d) 1029 (1934); Hudson
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From the broad statements of the Supreme Court it would seem that
the condemnee would be entitled to every element of damage due to the
condemnation. But certainly this has not been the case. The pendulum
swings from those cases which allow compensation for only the fair
market value of the bare real property taken 7 to the instant case which
allowed compensation for the cost of removal and demolition.* This
discussion will deal with compensation for removal of and injury to
(1) "trade fixtures" and (2) other goods and equipment.
The general rule for compensation in regard to removal expense has
been stated as follows: "Fixtures upon the property taken must be
valued and paid for as part of the real estate. .

.

. But damages to

personal property, or the expense of removing it from the premises
cannot be considered in estimating the coinpensation to be paid." 9 By
using the law of fixtures as an approach,1O* some courts have allowed
recovery for the removal expense of trade fixtures where the interest
involved was a freehold. Two examples of this are United States v.
Becktold" and United States v. Wiener.12 The former case followed
the general procedure of looking to the law of the state of the situs of
the property to determine whether the equipment was to be regarded
as fixtures that had become so affixed to the realty as to be treated a
part of it. Thus fixtures were included in the calculation of what
realty had been taken.l a * The significant statement quoted by the Circuit Court of Appeals from an earlier case to the effect that it would
be intolerable for the state, after condemning a factory or warehouse,
to surrender to the owner a stock of second-hand machinery and thus
discharge the full measure of its duty is, perhaps, indicative of an
attempt to use the law of fixtures to justify allowing the cost of removal. In the Wiener Case printing and engraving machines were
fastened to the floor of a building by bolts and supported by wooden
River Regulating Dist. v. Cady, 131 Misc. 768, 228 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1928);
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N. C. 200, 17 S. E. (2d) 10 (1941).
See note 3, supra.
O,The scope of this note will not include a discussion as to the consideration
of good will, cost of labor lost, or damages in future profit as elements to be
considered in compensation.
*2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1900) 1082.
2* WALSTH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) §10.
"When a chattel is attached to land in a permanent way, with the intention
on the part of the person who makes the annexation to incorporate the thing
annexed with the land permanently, as a part thereof, it loses its character as a
movable, becomes part of the land and becomes a fixture; it is no longer personal property, but has become real property."
1- 129 F. (2d) 473 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942).
12210 Fed.'832 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
12* When the fixtures are held to be part of the realty, and When the owner
elects to keep them and remove them from the premises, the method of computing
the damages is the value of the land as so enhanced less the value of the fixtures
after deducting from the value the cost of removal.
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and concrete beams. Although no statement was made as to the law
of the situs of the property controlling, this case likewise held the
machinery to be fixtures. To the contrary is Futrovsky v. United
States1 4 where large refrigerating equipment was treated as personalty.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia stated the rule,
applicable to fixtures in buildings in Federal condemnations, that if the
fixtures could be removed without substantial injury either to the real
estate or the fixtures, they remained personalty and need not be taken
as part of the realty. On the basis of this rule it was found that there
would be no substantial injury but the court went on to say that the
inconvenience and expense of removing a going business and-its equipment from the property taken could not be paid for directly and could
not operate indirectly to chahge chattels into real estate. Likewise in
Potomac Electric Power Co. v. United States,15 following the Futrovsky
Case, it was held that generators and power converters attached to the
building by concrete foundations were not affixed to the realty because no
substantial injury would be caused by their removal.",* From the similarity of the fact situations in these four cases, and from the opinions,
it would seem that the courts are disposed to hold that trade fixtures
have become part of the realty when they desire to avoid the rule that
removal of personal property is not to be considered as an element of
damages in eminent domain proceedings; while those courts which endeavor to uphold the rule have been inclined to find that the equipment
remained personal property.17 * By contrast with these last cases an
Oklahoma decision,1 8 involving a freehold interest, allowed the cost of
removal for a cotton gin. Without referring to the law of fixtures, it
was held to be the settled law of that state that the cost of removal was
a proper element of damages to be considered.
The law of fixtures approach has also been applied to leasehold
interests. Missouri,10 Michigan 20 and Iowa 2 ' have allowed the cost of
removal of trade fixtures on the theory that the property, while it
might be regarded as personal property between landlord and tenant,
yet as between tenant and third parties it was properly to be regarded
1466 F. (2d) 215 (App. D. C. 1933).
1585 F. (2d) 243 (App. D. C. 1936).

"6*However, concrete bases, conduits within the building, and the electrical
structure consisting of a blower, motor, and pipes were considered to be part of
the realty.
"'* It is interesting to note that the Potomac Case, though decided 3 years
later, was heard by four of the same judges as the Futrovsky Case.

" Oil Fields & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Treese Cotton Co., 78 Okla. 25, 187 Pac. 201
(1920).
19City of St. Louis v. St. Louis, 1. M. & S. Ry. Co., 266 Mo. 694, 182 S. W.
750 (1916).
In re Gratiot Ave., City of Detroit, 294 Mich. 569, 293 N. W. 755 (1940).
Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082.
198 N. W. 486 (1924).
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as realty. The Iowa decision stated that the machinery and fixtures
which gave the property its distinctive character as a laundry should be
taken into account.
A Maryland 22 case held that removal expense for fixtures could not
be allowed because the tenant would have to move the equipment at
some time and that shortening the tenancy would result in no greater'
expense to the lessee than he would ultimately have. Minnesota 23 and
New Jersey 24 decisions have refused to allow the expense of removal
of trade fixtures, but the New Jersey Equity Court admitted that it
was following "hard law" and suggested that the remedy lay with the
Legislature. On the other hand an Illinois case, 25 upholding several
previous decisions, allowed the cost of removal of fixtures on the basis
of the argument that the loss and expense of removal would be considerations in determining the price if there were a voluntary sale, and
that there should be no difference when the sale was a compulsory one.
26
Pennsylvania has allowed the cost of removing printing machinery,
and a Federal Court, sitting in that state, allowed the cost of removal
27
of dental equipment.
Consequently, it seems that the result of the instant case in allowing
the cost of removal of the fixtures as an element in computing the compensation can be justified on two grounds. The first of these could be
the method of applying the law of fixtures to leaseholds and allowing
the cost of removal of trade fixtures on the theory that the property,
while regarded as personal property between landlord and tenant, between tenant and third parties the same property might be treated as
realty. The second ground of justification is to be found in those
-"Mayor of hlItimore v. Gamse & Bros., 132 Md. 290, 104 Atl. 429 (1918).
23 Kafka v. Davidson, 135 Minn. 389, 160 N. W. 1021 (1917).
-' City of Newark v. Cook, 99 N. J. Eq. 527, 133 Atl. 875 (Ch. 1926), aff'd,
100 N. J. Eq. 581, 136 AtI. 915 (Ch. 1927).
"Metropolitan West Side El. R. Co. v. Siegal, 161 Ill. 638, 44 N. E. 276
(1896); Atchison, T. S. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Schneider, 127 Ill. 144, 20 N. E. 41
(189
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Hock, 118 Ill. 587, 9 N. E. 205 (1886).
But see, Braun v. Metropolitan West Side El. R. Co., 166 Ill. 434, 438, 46 N. E.
974, 976 (1896), where the Court did not repudiate the above decisions but
rather explained them. "All cases recognize the general rule as stated, and it
is certainly true that, when the owner has been allowed the full, cash market
price of his property, taking into consideration the use to which he has devoted
it, he has received just compensation therefor; and, whenever a consideration of
matters of personal convenience to the owner, loss of profits, damages to personal property, and cost of removal is permissible, it must be -when a sufficient
foundation therefor has been laid, so that their consideration simply aids the
jury and court in determining the fair cash value of the property, in view of its
present use. There is nothing in this case to bring it within any exception to
the general rule....
Whether such removal will be absolutely necessary or not
is not shown ......
"James McMillin Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. & W. Ry. Co., 216 Pa. 504,
65 Atl. 1091 (1907); see also Iron City Automobile Co. v. City of Pittsburgh,
253 Pa. 478, 98 Atl. 679 (1916).
"7National Laboratory and Supply Co. v. United States, 275-Fed; 218 (E. D.
Pa. 1921).
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decisions which allowed the cost of removal because of the equities of
the situation.
Allowing the cost of removal of the defendant's stock of goods is
harder to justify than the removal expenses for fixtures. A stock of
goods falls strictly within the category of personal property. In those
decisions involving freehold interests even the Becktold and Wiener
Cases would apparently deny the cost of removal of a stock of goods
in accord with the Futrovsky and Potomac Cases. In the leading case
of Joslin Manufacturing Co. v. City of Providence,28 the Supreme
Court upheld a statute as non-discriminatory which gave compensation
for all removal costs, both as to fixtures and personalty, only to those
in possession before the statute was enacted. The Joslin decision was
rendered on the theory that there could be no complaint if the Legislature saw fit to extend the liability of the condemnor to include rights
for the condemnee that were otherwise generally excluded. Inferences
from a Louisiana case2 9 seem to indicate a contrary rule to that established by the statute upheld in the Joslin Case. The plaintiff claimed
$50 for the cost of removing residence* furnishings, and the Court, although not holding that such expense could be considered, simply stated
that the plaintiff had not offered satisfactory evidence t9 show what
the cost would be.
The split of decisions is more apparent in regard to allowing the
cost of removal of personal property from leasehold interests. The
leading case cited by both the majority and dissenting judges in the
instant case is Gershon Bros. v. United States.80 Here the Circuit
Court of Appeals, in refusing .to consider the cost of moving and loss
and breakage of stock from a leased warehouse, said: "Inconvenience
and expense incident to vacating premises upon the expiration of the
right to retain them are not proper subjects of consideration in determining the just compensation to be paid by the party acquiring the
right to possess them." The Gershon Case cited as authority the case
of Ranlet v. Concord Railroad-" where the cost of removing sheds and
quantities of coal and wood were borne by the condemnee. Both Minnesota 2 and New Jersey,33 which refused to allow the cost of removal
of fixtures, consistently held at the same time that the cost of removal
34
of personal property was not to be considered. The Missouri, Mich28262 U. S. 668, 43 Sup. Ct. 684, 67 L. ed. 1167 (1923).
Housing Authority of Shreveport v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So. (2d) 295
(1942).

284 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922).
31 62 N. H. 561 (1883).
32 Kafka v. Davidson, 135 Minn. 389, 160 N. W. 1021 (1917).
City of Newark v. Cook, 99 N. J. Eq. 527, 133 Atl. 875 (Ch. 1926), aff'd,
100 N. J. Eq. 581, 136 Atl. 915 (Ch. 1927).
3, City of St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 266 Mo. 694, 182 S. W.
30

750 (1916).
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5

igan and Iowa cases,30 which allowed recovery for the removal of the
fixtures on the theory that they were to be considered part of the realty,
nevertheless followed the general rule as to personal property and refused to allow the cost of removal of stocks of goods. The Missouri
Court made the observation that one lessee might purposely move his
business farther than would another lessee thus incurring a greater
expense, and said further that the lessee should stand in no better position than the owner of a fee. Of the IllinoisT and Pennsylvania 8 cases
which allowed the cost of removal of the fixtures, only the Illinois case
involved the removal of a stock of goods too. In this decision removal
expenses for both were allowed.
The decision in the instant case has perhaps opened a new avenue
of relief for the individual who has been placed in the awkward position of being forced from his property by condemnation proceedings.
The strict rule, so often controlling in many cases and contended for
by the Government in the General Motors Case, is based on the fair
market value of the space in its naked form-regardless of whether
the property was in use or vacant. In view of the broad statements
laid down by the Supreme Court and the various other courts which
have reiterated the same idea---"the owner is to be put in as good position as if his property had not been taken"-it would seem that many
more elements should be considered in determining the fair amount of
compensation whether the interest confiscated be a leasehold or a freehold. Perhaps the strictness of the rules of damages in condemnation
proceedings can be accredited to the epoch in which eminent domain
had its most flourishing peri6d-that time when the United States was
a growing nation which needed a policy that would foster rather than
hinder the development of railroads and other utilities. Now that the
needs of the development period no longer take precedence over the rights
of the individual it might be well to relax the strict and "hard law" of
compensation in eminent domain proceedings. It must be remembered
that condemnation is not to be considered a voluntary transaction but
rather a forced sale. True, the good of the whole should be paramount
to the (minute) detriment to the individual, but whenever possible these
equities should be a little more evenly balanced.
The Supreme Court in Mitchell v. United States has seemingly
adopted the wider test of the fair market value when it said: "The
special value of the land due to its adaptability for use in a particular
"In re Gratiot Ave., City of Detroit, 294 Mich. 569, 293 N. W. 755 (1940).
" Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082,
198 N. W. 486 (1924).
17 Metropolitan West Side El. R. Co. v. Siegal, 161 Ill.
638, 44 N. E. 276
(1896).
"James McMillin Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. & W. Ry. Co., 216 Pa. 504;
65 Atl. 1091 (1907).
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business is an element which the owner of the land is entitled, under
the Fifth Amendment, to have considered in determining the amount to
be paid as just compensation upon the taking by eminent domain.1130
If the transaction were a voluntary' sale, certainly the items of removal
of equipment, machinery and goods would be elements to be considered
in the price arrangement. If by chance the prospective purchaser or
lessee were interested in obtaining all the property, both real and personal, he would be willing to pay more; and if he did not desire the personal property, it would be worth a considerable amount to have it
removed.
The inequities of the forced sale seem even more acute in regard
to condemnation of leasehold interests. The cost of removal of the
fixtures and the stock of goods should be considered among the elements
of damages. In considering whether the market value test is appropriate for the condemned leasehold interest a Pennsylvania court aptly
bared the situation when it said: "But the market value is an unsatisfactory test of the value to a tenant of the leasehold interest. It is
really no test at all because the lease rarely has any market value. Generally it is not assignable at the will of the tenant, and he pays in rent
all the right of occupation is worth. The right of which he is deprived,
and for which he is entitled to full compensation, is the right to remain
in undisturbed possession to the end of the term. The loss resulting
from the deprivation of this right is what he is entitled to recover. The
value of the right he is forced to sell cannot ordinarily be measured by
its market price, for there is no market for it; nor can it always be
measured by the difference between the rent reserved and the rental
value if the lease be a favorable one. If, as was the case here, a tenant,
engaged in a business requiring the use of heavy machinery and appliances, should secure a new place equally well adapted to his business;
and at the same rent, he would still be at the expense of removal, and
' '40
at a loss because of the stoppage of his business.
One consideration often overlooked is the duration of the confiscation. Property is commonly taken outright. If, however, it is condemned for only a term of years in the case of a freehold, the owner
must under the general rule bear the cost of removal and then the
subsequent cost of moving back. If only part of the term of a leasehold
interest is condemned, as in the instant case where the Government
condemned the space for a year out of six-year lease,4i* the tenant
39
4 0 267 U. S. 341, 344, 45 Sup. Ct. 293, 294, 69 L. ed. 644, 648 (1925).
James McMillin Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. & W. Ry. Co., 216 Pa. 504,
511, 65 AtI. 1091, 1094 (1907).
41* Subsequent to the trial, an amendment to the petition for condemnation
was filed which changed the period from one year to a term renewable for additional yearly periods thereafter during the existing national emergency. A
footnote on p. 874 to the opinion stated: "We do not understand, however, that
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likewise has not only the cost of removal but also the cost of moving
back to complete the term of the lease. Often the lessee has the right
to renewal or an option to renew on a favorable lease. The only method
available to the tenant to lessen this expense would be to sublet the
remaining part of the term, or in the case of renewal, to give up this
profitable right.
In the instant case the Government deprived the General Motors
Corporation not only of its space, but also required the removal of
fixtures and a stock of goods much of which was demolished because
it could not be moved. It cannot be argued logically that the Government did not "take" this property. The defendant was deprived of the
space and of the use of that space and was put to considerable expense.
The demolition and removal expense were no criteria of the value of
the space condemned, but they were definite criteria of the value of the
use to which that space had been put.
The decision in this case opened a pathway through the old test of
using the fair market value of the bare realty confiscated. Perhaps it
points the way to a standard of evaluation in which the owner or lessee
will actually be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken. The result is a realistic
approach to this problem.4*
IDRIENNE

E. LEvY.

Torts-Liability of Parent for Torts of ChildDangerous Weapons
What is the liability of a parent for torts committed by a child with
a gun given by the parent? The question was raised in a recent West
this amended petition has any bearing upon the issues before the court below or

here."
4

*Two decisions handed .down by District Judge Yankwich since this note
was originally written have refused to allow the cost of removal to be considered.

One of these, United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 54 Fed. Supp. 561 (S. D.

Cal. 1944) was decided 8 days after the General Motors Case and without reerence to it. The other, United States v. 0.64 Acres of Land, 54 Fed. Supp.
562- (S. D. Cal. 1944) a month later, noted the decision handed down by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, but refused to follow it and approved the
views of the dissenting judge . . . that if the owner of the fee was not entitled
to cost .of removal, there could be no reason for allowing it to the tenant in a
leasehold interest. This entirely overlooks the distinctions just noted above and
the special hardship present in the cases where less than the condemnee's full
term is taken. At page 563 District Judge Yankwich made this observation:
"Had a principle of law which would allow relocation cost when the owner
occupies the premises and deny it when a tenant occupies them would establish
a criterion of differentiation would has no reasonable foundation in fact." Aside
from the difficulties of sentence structure it might be said of this statement that
it has no foundation in the cases. It is conceded that the owner of a freehold
has been denied this element of compensation, for the most part, but that the
leasehold tenant has been given special consideration. There has not been found
any line of authority which would approve of allowing cost of removal to the
owner of the fee and denying it to the tenant under the leasehold interest.
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Virginia case1 in which the complaint alleged that the defendant parents
gave their four-year-old son an air rifle, knowing by reason of his infancy that he was incapable of the use of judgment, care, and discretion in the use of an air rifle; and, knowing that the air rifle was
a dangerous instrumentality permitted him to have it under his control;
and that the infant carelessly discharged a shot which destroyed the
vision of the plaintiff's eye. The defendant demurred on the ground
that the declaration did not allege any negligent misconduct on the
defendant's part proximately causing plaintiff's injuries. The court
held that an air rifle was not inherently dangerous, but the complaint
alleged sufficient facts without minute circumstances constituting evidence which was sufficient for overruling the demurrer.
It is well settled under common law that a parent is liable for the
torts of his child only on such grounds as would make him liable for
the torts of any other person.2 The mere relationship of parent and
child is not sufficient to hold the parent liable for torts committed by
his child3 in the absence of statute to the contrary; rather infants are
4
liable for torts committed the same as are adults.
Where a child has committed a tort with a gun, the gist of the
parent's liability is upon agency or employmentS* or upon his own
negligence in permitting his incapable minor child to have the gun, or
access to one, whereby the damage proximately resulted.
A dangerous weapon is one likely to produce death or great bodily
harm. 6 Although a gun is a dangerous weapon under some circumstances, mere possession or use is not per se unlawful.7 Therefore a
parent is not negligent for simply putting a firearm in the hands of an
'Mazzocchi v. Seay, W. Va. -,
29 S. E. (2d) 12 (1944).
21 CooLFY, TORTs (3rd ed. 1906) 180; NoTE (1941) N. C. L. Rwv. 605.
* Palm v. Ivorson, 117 Ill. App. 535 (1905); Basset v. Riley, 131 Mo. App.
721, 111 S. W. 596 (1908); Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N. C. 299, 66 S. E. 128

(1909).

'Wilson v. Garrard, 59 Ill. 51 (1874); Paul v. Hummel, 43 Mo. 119, 97 Am.
Dec. 381 (1888).
'The general rules of agency apply in such a case. In the case of Figone
v. Gui sti, 43 Cal. App. 606, 185 Pac. 694 (1919) the defendant hired his minor
son to work in a saloon. In response to a threat of a patron to shanghai him,
the minor discharged a pistol, kept in case of robbery, killing the patron. A
California court held the master parent not liable for the results, since they
arose out of a private quarrel and were not within the scope of the employment.
In Winkler v. Fisher, 95 Wis. 355, 70 N. W. 477 (1897) the Wisconsin court
held a minor son who had been directed to kill crows in a corn field, but who
had gone two miles away to hunt squirrels, not to be within the scope of the
employment, thereby releasing the parent from liability.
However the parent is liable for torts committed within the scope of the employment. Carmouche v. Bovis, 6 La. Ann. 95, 54 Am. Dec. 558 (1851) ; Dixon
v. Bell, 5 Maule & Sel. 198, 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (1816) ; Brittingham v. Stadiem,
151 N. C. 299. 66 S. E. 128 (1909).
'Parman v. Lemmon, 120 Kan. 370, 244 Pac. 227 (1926).
1 Clarine v. Addison, 182 Minn. 310, 234 N. W. 295 (1931).
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infant son.8 It is generally held that a BB gun (air rifle) is not a
dangerous weapon and does not belong to any branch of the weapon
family.'*
The negligence of the parent is divided into two general fields:
(1) Where the parent negligently places a weapon where an incompetent child can get it, and (2) where the parent is negligent in permitting an incapable infant to possess or use a firearm.
A parent is negligent when he places a loaded gun where an infant
child can reach it, provided that a prudent man would have perceived
danger, though not necessarily the specific harm. 1° * One case approaches the imposition of absolute liability on the parent. 1' The parent
had broken the stock from the gun and had thrown both stock and
barrel under the bed. He had ordered the son not to bother the gun
and did not know the son had it. A Rhode Island court affirmed a
charge to the jury which would hold a parent liable if the jury found
the parent negligent in leaving the gun where the son would find it
and use it; and the son was of insufficient age and experience to be
trusted with the weapon.
In order to hold the parent negligent in permitting an infant child
to have or use a gun, the following requisites must be shown:
1. The child must have been careless in the past or was of such
tender years as would be indicative of his being incapable to handle a
dangerous weapon. Generally it is not age but experience which determines whether the parent could have foreseen possible harm.12 *
' Wood v. O'Neill, 90 Conn. 497, 97 Ati. 753 (1916); Clarine v. Addison, 182
Minn. 310, 234 N. W. 295 (1931).
o, Capps v. Carpentar, 129 Kan. 462, 283 Pac. 655 (1930). But see Archibald
v. Jewell, 70 Pa. Sup. Ct. 247 (1918) where the court was unable to say as a
matter of law that an irresponsible boy with the full knowledge of his father
may possess and use as an innocent toy a device loaded with 50 BB shot, capable
of being discharged with such force as to destroy the eye of a human being at
a distance of 50 feet.
10* Sullivan v. Creed, [1904] 2K. B. 317 (Parent left gun inside the stile of
his own land, next to a path leading from a public road to his cottage.) ; Sojka
v. Dlugosz, 293 Mass. 419, 200 N. E. 554 (1936) (Parent left gun and cartridges
on pantry shelf without any instruction to the child as to the use thereof.) ; Phillips v. Barnett, 2 N. Y. City Ct. Rep. 20 (1889) (Parent left loaded revolver
in an unlocked bureau drawer. The court held the father liable on the ground
that he was negligent in keeping such a dangerous weapon within reach of the
child.) But see Swanson v. Crandall, 2 Pa. Sup. Ct. 85 (1896) (Parent left a
loaded revolver in the upper drawer of a chiffonier used exclusively by him in
his bedroom. The Pennsylvania court held the father not to be negligent when
his five-year-old daughter found the gun and fired it, injuring the plaintiff. The
shooting of the revolver was not the natural and probable consequence and could
not be anticipated as the usual and natural result. Hence the keeping of the
loaded revolver was not the proximate cause of the accident.)
In Frellesen v. Colburn, 156 Misc. 254, 281 N. Y. Supp. 471 (1935) the father
separated the shells and gun. There was no-evidence that the father had any
knowledge that his son had ever used the gun before. When the son shot a dog,
the parent was held to be free from negligence under the circumstances.
" Salisbury v. Crudale, 41 R. I. 33, 102 Ati. 731 (1918).
14 Palm v. Ivorson, 117 Ill. App. 535 (1905) (Parent was not negligent where
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2. The parent must have been notified that the child was careless,
negligent, or reckless. It is immaterial whether such knowledge
was
derived from seeing his child's act of negligence or from being
informed
of them by others.13* The fact that the father is momentarily
absent
from the house at the time of the shooting does not suffice
either to
exempt him from responsibility or to transfer it to the mother
who is
14
present. *
3. The parent, having a knowledge of the carelessness,
negligence,
and recklessness must have made it possible for the child
to do the
mischief. It is essential that the parent be able to foresee
the negligence of the child.15* Thus it is held that a parent cannot
reasonably
foresee that his child will lend it to a third party who will commit
a tort
upon the plaintiff.'"* When a child discharges the gun, and
for some
the 12-year-old child was a thoroughly experienced marksman.);
Turner v.
Snider, 16 Manitoba Rep. 79 (1907) (Defendant's 14-year-old
son was carefully
trained m the use of a gun and ordinarily used great
skill in handling it under
such circumstances that the father was justified in assuming
reasonable care. When the son negligently discharged his that he would use
gun, setting fire to
the prairie grass, the parent was not liable.) ; Herndobler
146 Pac. 140 (1915) (Defendant's son had owned and usedv. Rippen, 75 Ore. 22,
a rifle since he was
nine years old. Through his negligence he shot the plaintiff.
The defendant
was 3not liable.).
t *Gudiewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N. E.
334 (1914) (Evidence
that the mother had seen the son shopting in yard and vicinity
was held admissible to show that the parents knew of their with an air rifle
gence.); Kuchlick v. Feuer, 239 App. Div. 338, 268 N. Y. minor son's negliSupp. 256 (1933)
(Son had been shooting at street
The parent knew or "should have
known."); Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S.lamps.
D. 237, 76 N. W. 933, 74 Am. St. Rep. 933
(1898) (On previous occasions the son had called
people abusive names and frequently discharged firearms at passers-by in the presence of
son v. Nokes, 60 Wis. 511, 19 N. W. 382, 50 Am. Rep. 381 the parent.) ; Havertwo sons had fired at Plaintiff's horses, frightening them, (1884) (Defendant's
on previous occasions
in the defendant's presence.) ; cf. Whitesides
Wheeler, 158 Ky. 121, 164 S. W.
335 (1914) (The court refused evidence to v.prove
that others thought the defendant's son was insane. Nothing but overt acts of violence
are competent on
this issue, and even such overt acts must be within the
fendant to make him liable.); Basset v. Riley, 130 Mo. knowledge of the deApp.
596 (1908) (Defendant's 17-year-old son stepped out the door, 721, 111 S. W.
telling his father
that he was going to scare a dog. The parent was
not liable for the accidental
shooting of the dog by the son because the parent had
no
way to know that the
son's intention was toijious.). Ritter v. Thibordeaux, 41 S.
1897) (A father who does not permit his minor son to use W. 492 (Tex. App.,
sible in damages for the tort of his son, who purposely anda gun is not responcarelessly shoots a
companion while on a hunting trip made without
the father's knowledge.).
"'*Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1886) ; but
see Charton v. Jackson, 183
Mo. App. 613, 167 S. W. 670 (1914) (Mother
well as father is liable in permitting the child to use the firearm, where in as
the father's absence, she fails to
exercise the authority devolving upon her.).
'5* Meers v. McDowell, 110 Ky.
926, 62 S.
1013 (1901) (Defendant plied
his minor son of weak and undeveloped mind W.
with liquors, and while the son
was under the influence thereof, permitted the son
to have a loaded rifle with
which the son subsequently shot the plaintiff.).
1 *Harris v. Cameron, 81 Wis. 239, 51 N. W. 437 (1892)
(By implication
the purchase of the gun by the parent was not the
cause, and he could
not reasonably foresee such an act.) ; cf. Chaddock proximate
v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 225, 50
N. W. 135, 14 L. R. A. 675 (1892).
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undisclosed reason a match is expelled, injuring the plaintiff, the purchase of the gun is not the proximate cause; and the parent is not
liable.' 7 But if the parent knows that his child is using a firearm in a
careless and negligent manner, it is his parental duty to interpose and
prevent a course of conduct on the part of the child which is likely to
produce injury to others.s* If the minor child is suspended, even
temporarily, from the parental authority and subjected to the authprity
of another, the parent is not liable.lO*
4. The child must have inflicted injury upon the plaintiff from
which the plaintiff could have recovered from the child. It is obligatory on the plaintiff that he must not contribute to his own negligence.
20
All defenses that the child may have had are available to the parent. *
Where the child has committed a tort, and the parent subsequently
promises to pay for the damage done, the parent is not liable for breach
of contract if he later refuses to pay. Such a promise is made without
consideration, and no valid contract is created. 21
Under Louisiana statutes 22 the parent is liable for torts committed
by unemancipated children. The courts of that state have held the
parent liable for injuries resulting from such acts, intentional or careless, on the part of the child.P Georgia, by statute, 24 holds the parent
liable for the tort of his child "committed at the parent's command, or
in the persecution and within the scope of his business." In a case
under this statute the parent is liable if the child acts as the parent's
servant or agent.25
Thus under pleadings the plaintiff in the Mazzocchi Case, supra,
has stated a good cause of action.
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